We test some predictions about the effects of technological progress on geographic expansion using data on banks in U.S. multibank holding companies over 1985-98. Specifically, we test whether over time (1) parental control over affiliate banks has increased and (2) the agency costs of distance from the parent have decreased. The data suggest that banking organizations' control over affiliates has been increasing over time and that the agency costs of distance have decreased somewhat over time. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that technological progress has facilitated the geographic expansion of the banking industry.
companies (MBHCs) increased by over 50% on average, from 123.35 to 188.91 miles, as many MBHCs acquired banks in other states and regions.
The role of deregulation in the geographic expansion of this industry is well understood. In the United States, a series of deregulations in the 1980s and early 1990s removed restrictions on intrastate and interstate banking, culminating with the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, which permitted interstate branching in almost all states as of June 1997. In the European Union, the set of actions known as the Single Market Programme-especially the single license provision of the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive of 1989-essentially allowed banking organizations to expand continent-wide. In Latin America, the transition nations of Eastern Europe, and other regions, explicit and implicit regulatory barriers to foreign entry have fallen, allowing banking organizations headquartered in other nations to gain significant market shares.
The role of technological progress in facilitating geographic expansion is less well understood. In any industry, there are potential diseconomies to geographic expansion in the form of agency costs associated with monitoring junior managers in a distant locale. Improvements in information processing and telecommunications may lessen these agency costs by improving the ability of senior managers located at the organization's headquarters to monitor and communicate with staff at distant subsidiaries. In the banking industry, technologies such as ATM networks and transactional Internet websites allow banks to interact efficiently with customers over long distances. Advances in financial technologies also facilitate long-distance interfaces with customers. Greater use of quantitative methods in applied finance, such as credit scoring, may allow banks to extend credit without geographic proximity to the borrower by "hardening" their credit information (Stein 2002) . Similarly, the new products of financial engineering, such as derivative contracts, may allow banks to unbundle, repackage, or hedge risks at low cost without respect to the distance from the counterparty. These financial innovations may allow senior managers to monitor decisions made by loan officers and managers at distant affiliate banks more easily, and evaluate and manage the contributions of individual affiliate banks to the organization's overall returns and risk more efficiently.
In this study, we examine data on commercial banks in U.S. MBHCs over 1985-98, and test whether these data are consistent with some predictions about the effects of technological progress. We assess changes over time in the ability of managers at the "lead" or "parent" bank in the MBHC to control the performance of their "nonlead" affiliates, as well as changes over time in the agency costs associated with the distance between the parents and affiliates. While previous studies have examined these managerial control and geographic distance phenomena on a crosssectional basis, this study breaks new ground by testing whether technological innovation over time has improved the ability of banking companies to control their operations and/or mitigate the agency costs associated with distance. We study U.S. MBHCs over 1985-98 because the lion's share of geographic expansion by U.S. banks during this time period used the MBHC framework and because these organizations significantly increased their use of new information processing, telecommunications, and financial technologies over this interval.
We define "control" as the ability of the organization's senior managers to export their managerial skills, policies, and procedures to their affiliate banks. Since we cannot directly observe how banks are managed, we proxy for control by measuring the extent to which the efficiency rank of a nonlead bank affiliate varies with the efficiency rank of the lead bank in the same MBHC. Efficiency ranks are described in detail below. We measure the "control derivative" ∂NONLEADRANKր ∂LEADRANK t , where NONLEADRANK is the efficiency rank of a nonlead bank affiliate in a MBHC, LEADRANK is the efficiency rank of the lead bank in the same MBHC, and | t indicates evaluation at period t. This derivative is expected to be positive and to lie between 0 (no control) and 1 (very good control). We estimate the control derivative in a multiple regression framework, and it represents the average degree to which multibank organizations in year t are able to control their affiliates. Our hypothesis that technological progress has improved the control of banking organizations yields the prediction that ∂NONLEADRANKր∂LEADRANK t should be increasing with t.
Our maintained assumptions are that the senior managers of the organization are located at the lead bank (the largest bank in the MBHC) and that LEADRANK is a good proxy for the skills, policies, and procedures available to manage the entire organization. Importantly, both well-managed and poorly managed organizations can have a high degree of control. Efficient senior managers with substantial control may transfer best-practices techniques to junior managers at their affiliate banks, whereas inefficient senior managers with significant control may transfer worst practices to affiliates.
We define "agency costs of distance" as the additional expenses or lost revenues that arise as senior managers try to monitor and control local managers from a greater distance. The general effect of these agency costs is expected to be negative, as local managers operating at greater distance have more freedom to pursue their own objectives, resulting in lower efficiency ranks. These agency costs may also incorporate a potentially offsetting senior management effect: operating at a greater distance from very inefficient senior managers may enhance efficiency if it interferes with the transfer of worst practices. Thus, the agency costs of distance may depend on the efficiency of senior management, with more costs involved with increased distance from good senior management and less costs, or even gains in affiliate efficiency, associated with increased distance from bad senior management. Since we cannot directly observe agency costs, we proxy (inversely) for the agency costs of distance by measuring the extent to which the efficiency ranks of nonlead affiliate banks vary with the distance from their lead banks. We measure the "distance derivative" ∂NONLEADRANKր∂lnDISTANCE t ,where lnDISTANCE is the natural log of the distance in miles between the affiliate bank and its lead bank. For any value of t, this derivative is expected to be negative for most banks, as greater distance implies more problems in aligning the incentives of local managers with those of the organization. However, when senior management is very inefficient, the senior management effect may overwhelm the general agency cost effect, yielding a net positive distance derivative. We investigate this possibility below. The distance derivative is estimated in the same multiple regression framework as the control derivative. Our hypothesis that technological progress has reduced the agency costs of distance yields the general prediction that ∂NONLEADRANKր∂lnDISTANCE t , should be increasing with t.
We acknowledge that factors other than technological change also affect the control of parent organizations and the agency costs of distance. For this reason, we include variables in our empirical analysis to account for changes in competition, regulation, and other environmental conditions that may potentially influence parental control and the agency costs of distance, and we conduct numerous tests to ensure that our results are not explained by sample selection bias, specification choices, bank size class effects, choice of time period, and so forth. Moreover, as in almost all studies of technological progress, it is difficult to deterministically link performance improvements to technological change because technology is difficult to specify, its effects are difficult to parameterize, and its adoption may in some cases be endogenous to firm and industry performance. Nonetheless, previous research suggests that banking firms are one of the best places to test for the effects of technological improvement. Banks have embraced substantial advances in both physical and financial technologies during the past two decades, and the broader industry category of which banking is a part, Depository and Nondepository Financial Institutions, is the most information technology-intensive industry in the United States (Triplett and Bosworth 2002, Table 2 ). As well, when specific banking technologies have been studied, such as improvements in the processing of electronic payments, very large productivity gains have been directly linked to technological changes (e.g., Hancock, Humphrey, and Wilcox 1999) . 
REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH LITERATURE
To our knowledge, no prior studies have directly examined whether and by how much technological change over time has improved the ability of senior bank managers to control the performance of their affiliates, branches, or other business units. As well, we are unaware of previous research investigating whether and by how much technological advances have reduced the agency costs associated with the distance from these geographically remote units. However, there are prior studies of related topics, including the degree to which bank productivity has improved over time, the degree to which bank-borrower distance has increased over time, the effects of organizational form on bank performance, and the cross-sectional effects of control and distance on bank efficiency. We briefly review some of this related research.
Because the banking industry is relatively information-intensive, it may have been among the first industries to take meaningful advantage of the benefits of information processing and telecommunications-technological advances that could improve parental control over their affiliate banks and reduce the agency costs of 1. See Berger (2003) for a general review of technological progress in banking.
distance. Data from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, which are based on a simple weighted measure of transactions per employee hour, are consistent with this possibility (Furlong 2001) . Studies using cost productivity or linear programming methods to measure productivity for U.S. banks in the 1990s often found either productivity declines or only very slight improvements (e.g., Wheelock and Wilson, 1999 , Stiroh, 2000 , Berger and Mester, 2003 . However, the latter of these studies found increasing profit productivity even while cost productivity declined, suggesting substantial revenue-based productivity improvements. This finding suggests that technological progress made banks more profit efficient by allowing them to offer a wider array of costlier, but higher quality services that generated increased revenues in excess of the higher costs.
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Recent research has also found that banks have been increasing the distances at which they make small business loans over time (e.g., Rajan, 2002, Hannan, 2003) and that this trend has been facilitated in part by the adoption of the small business credit scoring technology, which is associated with increased out-of-market lending (Frame, Padhi, and Woosley 2004) . These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that technology may have increased parental control and reduced the agency costs of distance by making it easier to monitor loan officers and other personnel at greater distances. Of course, these findings may have other causes as well. For example, one study found a link between the increased integration of state and regional economies and the geographic expansion of banks (Morgan, Rime, and Strahan 2003) , suggesting that a more geographically integrated economy eases the management tasks of MBHCs.
Other distance-related research has found that expanded geographic reach has had generally favorable effects on bank performance. Some studies found that larger, more geographically integrated institutions tend to have better risk-expected return frontiers (e.g., Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon, 1996, Demsetz and Strahan, 1997). 3 Others found that banking organization mergers and acquisitions (M&As) raise profit efficiency in a way consistent with the benefits of improved geographic diversification, although M&As may not have much effect on cost efficiency (e.g., Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey, 1997 , Berger, 1998 . These studies generally found that the pre-merger gap in efficiency between the acquirer and target had relatively little effect on the change in efficiency surrounding the M&A, suggesting that the ability of acquirers to export their skills, policies, and procedures to targets may be limited. In contrast, studies of international banking expansion tend to find that foreign affiliates operate less efficiently than domestic banks in developed nations, particularly in the United States (e.g., DeYoung and Nolle, 1996, Berger, DeYoung, 2. Studies using 1980s data often found productivity declines during the early part of the decade associated with adjustments to the deregulation of deposit rates (e.g., Humphrey 1992, Humphrey and Pulley 1997) . Many of these studies also found that the industry had adjusted to the new regime by the late 1980s.
3. A study of simulated mergers among small U.S. banks suggested that such mergers may also generate risk reductions, but that the key risk-reducing benefits for these banks stem from increased size, not greater geographic integration (Emmons, Gilbert, and Yeager 2004) . Genay, and Udell, 2000) , although cross-border expansion may involve many other costs due to social, economic, and legal differences across countries.
A number of cross-sectional studies examined the effects of organizational form and ownership on bank efficiency, with mixed results. Some have found that affiliate banks in MBHCs are more efficient than nonaffiliated independent banks (e.g., Spong, Sullivan, and DeYoung, 1995, Mester, 1996) , while others have found that MBHCs are less efficient (e.g., Grabowski, Rangan, and Rezvanian 1993) . Studies of the efficiency of individual branches of large branch-banking organizations found significant dispersion, consistent with relatively weak organizational control over individual branches (e.g., Sherman and Ladino, 1995, Berger, Leusner, and Mingo, 1997) . Finally, a study of banking offices in Texas finds that rural banking offices are more likely than urban banking offices to be locally owned; the authors conclude that the activities in which rural banks engage are more difficult to manage from a distance and hence require decision-making authority at the local level (Brickley, Linck, and Smith 2003) .
To our knowledge, only two previous studies have directly explored the concepts of control and agency costs of distance in banking. A study of 715 commercial bank affiliates in five U.S. states in 1973 and 1974 found that the ability of MBHCs to control the performance of their affiliates varies both across MBHCs and across affiliates within MBHCs (Rose and Scott 1984) . A more recent crosssectional analysis of U.S. banks over 1993-98 found that parent organizations exercise significant control over the efficiency of their affiliates, although this control tends to dissipate rapidly with the distance to the affiliate (Berger and DeYoung 2001) . These studies were purely cross-sectional in nature, and hence did not test for intertemporal changes in control or agency costs of distance.
The current study extends this literature by testing whether the ability of banking companies to control their affiliates has improved over time, presumably due to access to new information processing, telecommunications, and financial technologies. We perform these tests for U.S. commercial bank holding companies from 1985 to 1998, a period during which (1) most large banking companies were still organized as MBHCs with affiliates located at various distances from headquarters, and (2) the implementation of new technologies potentially provided senior managers with better tools for controlling the behavior of those affiliates. Thus, we test not only whether technological progress has enhanced the potential for managerial control, but also whether technological advances have mitigated the agency costs of distance. Neither of these questions has been tested in the extant literature.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
We test for intertemporal changes in parental control and the agency costs of distance by analyzing the effects of lead bank efficiency rank and distance to the lead bank on the efficiency ranks of nonlead banks in U.S. MBHCs between 1985 and 1998. The U.S. data over this 14-year period provide an excellent opportunity for analyzing technological change, parental control, and distance effects. The U.S. market is economically large and geographically vast, and for most of this time period U.S. banking companies were generally required to use the MBHC framework to operate in multiple states. Because this organizational framework requires each affiliate to prepare a complete set of financial statements, we can observe the performance of each affiliate bank (lead and nonlead) separately, which allows us to estimate and test the changes in our control and distance derivatives. Obtaining clear measures of efficiency, parental control, geographic distance, and agency costs of distance are essential to our ultimate objective, which is to test whether technological progress has significantly affected the ability of banking companies to control their operations and/or mitigate the agency costs associated with distance.
We run our analyses separately by size of bank because of the different products, markets, and technologies for large and small banks. Large banks tend to produce more transactions-driven loans for large, wholesale customers based on "hard" quantitative information, such as certified audited financial statements. In contrast, small banks tend to specialize in relationship lending to small, retail customers based on "soft" information culled from close contacts over time of the loan officer with the firm, its owner, and its local community (e.g., Stein, 2002, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein, 2005) . Technological progress may affect the control and distance derivatives differently for large and small banks. Advances in information processing, telecommunications, and financial technologies are likely to be better adapted to processing, transmitting, and analyzing the hard information used by large banks than the soft information used by small banks, so there may be a greater increase over time in the control of large nonlead affiliates. The newer technologies often allow for the electronic transmission of hard information with little or no effect of distance, which may also result in a larger increase in control and a greater reduction in agency costs associated with longer distances for large banks. However, any of these effects could alternatively be greater for small affiliates than for large affiliates. It is possible that the technological improvements during the sample period may have allowed MBHCs to apply some of the hard-information techniques to small bank affiliates for the first time, in effect "hardening" their credit information. Thus, there may be a greater increase in control and/or a larger reduction in agency costs of distance over time for small bank affiliates than for large affiliates as MBHCs bring small business credit scoring and other hard-information techniques to small affiliates.
For these reasons, we separate the nonlead banks in MBHCs into two samples based on size. Our main sample includes annual observations of nonlead banks with gross total assets (GTA) in excess of $100 million (real 1998 dollars) in that year, and our small bank sample includes observations of nonlead banks in which GTA is less than or equal to $100 million (real 1998 dollars). We exclude from both samples all observations of banks that are less than 5 years old because prior research found that very young banks do not approach the efficiency of older small banks for several years. 4 As noted above, we assume that LEADRANK is a good measure of the managerial ability of the senior staff of the MBHC and that these senior managers are located at the lead bank. The first assumption allows us to interpret ∂NONLEADRANK/ ∂LEADRANK as a good proxy for control or how closely the performance of nonlead managers conform to the performance of their senior managers at the lead bank. The second assumption allows us to interpret ∂NONLEADRANK/∂lnDISTANCE as a good proxy for the agency costs of distance, or the losses due to the extra difficulties of senior managers in monitoring or controlling the performance of local managers from a greater distance. We believe these assumptions to be reasonablethe senior management of large MBHCs also usually directly manages the largest bank in the organization.
Regression Specification and Tests
Our analysis is primarily based on panel regressions of the efficiency rank of nonlead banks in MBHCs (NONLEADRANK) on the efficiency rank of the lead bank (LEADRANK) and the log of the distance to the lead bank (lnDISTANCE). We allow the control and distance effects to vary over time by including a time variable (t) in these regressions. A number of additional exogenous variables are included to account for other factors that may affect the efficiency of the nonlead bank. These regressions take the form:
NONLEADRANK it ϭ α ϩ β 1 *LEADRANK it ϩ β 2 *lnDISTANCE it ϩ β 3 *LEADRANK it *lnDISTANCE it ϩ γ 1 *tϩ 1 /2γ 2 *t 2 ϩ θ 1 *t*LEADRANK it ϩ θ 2 *t*lnDISTANCE it ϩ θ 3 *t*LEADRANK it *lnDISTANCE it ϩ 1 /2δ 1 *t 2 *LEADRANK it ϩ 1 /2δ 2 *t 2 *lnDISTANCE it ϩ 1 /2δ 3 *t 2 *LEADRANK it *lnDISTANCE it (1) ϩ β 4 *MSA it ϩ β 5 *HERF it ϩ β 6 *lnBKASS it ϩ β 7 * 1 /2lnBKASS
2 it ϩ β 8 *lnHCASS it ϩ β 9 * 1 /2lnHCASS 2 it ϩ β 10 *BKMERGE it ϩ β 11 *HCMERGE it ϩ β 12 *MNPL it ϩ β 13 *NUMAFFS it ϩ β 14 * 1 /2NUMAFFS where i indexes the nonlead affiliate bank and t indexes the time period, t ϭ 1,...,14 for the years 1985-98. We use OLS to estimate Equation (1) separately and independently for the main sample and the small bank sample. Within each of these samples, we also estimate Equation (1) for all of the observations and for a subset that includes only 'survivor' banks that continued to exist through the end of the sample period. The key variables in Equation (1) are NONLEADRANK, LEADRANK, and lnDISTANCE. NONLEADRANK is the profit efficiency rank of the nonlead bank affiliate. LEADRANK is the profit efficiency rank of the lead bank, defined as the largest bank in the MBHC. lnDISTANCE is the natural log of the distance in miles "as the crow flies" between the cities or towns in which the lead and nonlead banks are located (one mile added to DISTANCE before logging). The natural log form of lnDISTANCE allows for the likelihood that the travel time or cost per mile is decreasing in distance, i.e., time and cost economies of scale in distance. The database from which the distances are calculated matches the latitude and longitude over more than 19,000 different U.S. locations, nearly all cities, towns, and counties with over 5000 inhabitants. 5 We include the interaction term LEADRANK*lnDISTANCE in Equation (1) to account for the likelihood that parental control diminishes with distance or that the agency costs of distance may be greater when the lead bank is more efficiently managed (the senior management effect discussed above). We use a quadratic specification for the time variable t, specifying both t and 1 /2t 2 , and we interact both of these terms with the other important regressors, LEADRANK, lnDISTANCE, and LEADRANK*lnDISTANCE. This specification smoothes out year-to-year fluctuations in the control derivative and the distance derivative over time, and allows these derivatives to follow nonlinear time paths.
We expect the control derivative to be positive for all values of t and to be between 0 (no control) and 1 (very good control). We test the following null hypothesis:
where Equation (2) is evaluated for different values of lnDISTANCE. Once again we note that profit efficiency and parental control are independent concepts: efficient senior managers with substantial control may transfer best practices to junior managers at their affiliates, while inefficient senior managers with substantial control may transfer worst practices to affiliate banks. Our hypothesis that technological progress has improved the control of banking organizations predicts that ∂NONLEADRANKր∂LEADRANK t should be increasing over time for any given value of distance. We test the null hypothesis of no change in parental control over time in two different ways. First, we test the difference in the control derivative between t ϭ 14 and t ϭ 1 (i.e., between 1998 and 1985):
5. We deleted a small number of observations for which the location could not be determined. We were able to match the location of over 99% of the lead banks and more than 98% of the nonlead banks.
where Equation (3) is evaluated at the mean value of lnDISTANCE over the entire time period. This procedure avoids confounding the measured effects of control for a given distance with the effects of changes in distance over time. Second, we test whether the control derivative is increasing in t at the mean of the data, using the following second derivative:
The distance derivative is an inverse measure of the agency costs of distance. We expect the distance derivative to be negative in general for any value of t (i.e., positive agency costs). However, as discussed above, this derivative may be positive for very low levels of LEADRANK due to the potentially offsetting senior management effect. We test the following null hypothesis:
where Equation (5) is evaluated for various values of LEADRANK. Our hypothesis that technological progress has reduced the agency costs of distance predicts that ∂NONLEADRANK/∂lnDISTANCE should be increasing over time for any given value of lead bank efficiency. We test the null hypothesis of no change in the agency cost of distance in two different ways. First, we test the difference in the distance derivative between t ϭ 14 and t ϭ 1:
where Equation (6) is evaluated at the mean value of LEADRANK over the entire time period. Second, we test whether the distance derivative is decreasing in absolute value with t at the means of the data, using the following second derivative:
NONLEADRANKր∂lnDISTANCE∂t tϭmean ϭ (θ 2 ϩ θ 3 *LEADRANK) ϩ 2*( 1 /2δ 2 ϩ 1 /2δ 3 * LEADRANK)*t ϭ 0 .
To conserve degrees of freedom, only LEADRANK and lnDISTANCE are interacted with t in Equation (1). Hence, the coefficients on the remaining exogenous variables may be interpreted as the average effect of each variable over time. The market structure variables MSA and HERF are included to account for differences in competition, demand, and other market conditions that may affect bank performance. The variables lnBKASS and lnHCASS are included to account for the influences of bank size and holding company size on affiliate bank efficiency. The merger dummy variables BKMERGE and HCMERGE are included to help account for short-term changes in bank performance associated with the consolidation process. The market nonperforming loans-to-total loans ratio MNPL is intended to capture the local economic conditions that are most relevant to bank performance. The variable NUMAFFS is included to account for potential economies or diseconomies of scale in managing nonlead banks. NUMAFFS, lnBKASS, and lnHCASS are included as both first-and second-order terms in Equation (1) to allow for nonlinear scale effects. The regulatory dummy variables UNITB, LIMITB, INTER-STATE, and ACCESS attempt to capture the changes in state-by-state restrictions on geographic expansion at various times during the sample period. The vector STATE DUMMIES (counting the District of Columbia as a state, and excluding California as the base case) helps account for additional differences in conditions across states. Definitions and summary statistics for all of the variables (except STATE DUMMIES) are included in Table 1 .
Estimation of Equation (1) raises some econometric issues. First, the dependent variable NONLEADRANK and the independent variable LEADRANK are generated using OLS techniques (described in detail below). The inclusion of a generated regressor among the explanatory variables can in some circumstances affect the reported standard errors; however, Pagan (1984) demonstrates that the coefficient standard errors are consistent when the generated regressor is a residual from a least squares regression, which is the case here with LEADRANK. The additional noise in the generated dependent variable NONLEADRANK increases the regression standard error, but does not bias the estimated coefficients.
Second, merger and acquisition activity increased during our sample period, which may affect our measured control and distance derivatives for reasons unrelated to technological progress. For example, control may have improved over time if nonlead banks that were poorly controlled early in the sample period were merged with bettercontrolled affiliates or with the lead bank later in the sample period. Similarly, the agency costs of distance may have decreased over time because the banks that were the hardest to control at a given distance were merged out of existence. We address this issue by estimating Equation (1) for both the "full data set" and a "survivor data set" that includes only nonlead banks that survived through 1998 (regardless of when they entered the data set and regardless of whether they were still nonlead banks in MBHCs in 1998).
Third, a maintained assumption is that the geographic distribution of nonlead affiliate banks is exogenous and is not influenced by the absolute or relative levels of lead and nonlead bank efficiency. We recognize that this is an abstraction: at the 
Notes:
The data are annual observations for nonlead banks in MBHCs for the years 1985-98. The lead bank is defined as the largest banking affiliate in the MBHC, and a nonlead bank is any commercial banking affiliate in an MBHC other than the lead bank. The Main Sample includes annual observations of nonlead banks with gross total assets (GTA) in excess of $100 million, whereas the Small Bank Sample includes observations in which GTA is less than or equal to $100 million (real 1998 dollars). The Full Data Sets include all observations, while the Survivor Data Sets include only nonlead banks that survived through 1998.
Data are from the U.S. commercial bank Call Reports, the FDIC Summary of Deposits, and authors' calculations.
margin, well-run organizations may be more likely than average to acquire and manage affiliate banks located far from headquarters. To the extent that this effect is present in our data, then our estimated distance derivatives (Equation 5) will understate the agency costs of distance because longer distances will tend to be found in organizations that are better able to manage distance-related costs. Hence, finding a negative sign for the distance derivative is a strong result, as it indicates that the agency costs of distance more than offset the managerial efficiency effect. Similarly, the distribution of nonlead affiliate banks within an MBHC may be endogenous to past acquisition patterns-for example, if inefficient MBHCs systematically acquired more efficient affiliates in order to 'import' managerial talent and best practices. To the extent that this phenomenon is present in our data, then MBHCs with inefficient lead banks would contain a mix of relatively inefficient nonlead banks (i.e., the original affiliates) and relatively efficient nonlead banks (i.e., the newly acquired affiliates), causing a dispersion in NONLEADRANK away from LEADRANK that would bias our estimated control derivative (Equation 2) toward zero. Hence, finding a positive sign for the control derivative is a strong result. Because we cannot directly observe the implementation of new technologies at banks and bank holding companies, we must rely on the time variable t as a proxy for technological progress. As stated above, this is common practice in the empirical microeconomic and macroeconomic literatures. We acknowledge that this is an imperfect measure because it pools technological advance with other intertemporal changes in conditions faced by banks. For this reason our right-hand-side specification of Equation (1) includes a number of variables that control for 'other' important environmental changes over time, including state and interstate regulatory restrictions (UNITB, LIMITB, INTERSTATE, ACCESS), local competitive conditions (HERF), and local economic conditions (MNPL). In addition, we also check the robustness of our results by estimating Equation (1) and the derivatives (Equations 2-7) for sub-periods of our 1985-98 data set.
Summary Statistics
The summary statistics displayed in Table 1 allow us to compare the banks in the main and small bank samples, as well as the banks in the full and survivor data sets. The survivor data sets have fewer than half as many observations as the full data sets because of the substantial consolidation of the banking industry. These consolidation effects may have an especially large impact on nonlead banks in MBHCs, as these nonlead banks were especially prone to disappear over time as geographic deregulation allowed MBHCs to combine affiliates at greater distances. Consistent with the consolidation, the mean value of t is around 9 for the survivor data sets versus around 7 for the full data sets, as the survivor data sets exclude more of the early observations. Note that average bank efficiency is about the same in the survivor data sets and the full data sets-this reflects the fact that we are measuring efficiency using ranks rather than levels.
Most of the comparisons between the main and small bank samples yield the expected findings. Compared to the nonlead banks in the main sample, the small nonlead banks tend to be (1) located much closer to their lead bank, (2) in more highly concentrated rural markets, and (3) in much smaller MBHCs with fewer total affiliates. The average efficiency across the two samples is very similar because the efficiency ranks are measured only against other banks in the same size grouping (above or below $100 million in GTA). Finally, the nonlead affiliates have higher cost and profit efficiency ranks on average than the lead banks in both the main sample and the small bank sample. This could reflect a number of different factors. Back-office operations and headquarters functions such as payroll processing, marketing, and legal support may not be fully accounted for in intra-organizational accounting (e.g., incorrect or incomplete transfer pricing), resulting in financial statement subsidies flowing from lead banks to nonlead affiliates. In addition, it is likely that our efficiency model does not fully specify the wide scope of financial products and services produced at large lead banks (e.g., private banking, proprietary mutual funds, merger finance, global services). Finally, the high mean efficiency levels of nonlead banks relative to lead banks could simply be an arithmetic result of the fact that efficient banking organizations (i.e., high efficiency ranks at both the lead and nonlead banks) tend to have relatively large numbers of affiliates. 6 We include a number of right-hand-side variables in our regression Equation (1) to try to mitigate these potential effects. Figure 1 shows how the average distance between nonlead affiliates in MBHCs and their lead banks has evolved over time. For the main sample, the average distance increased by about 60%-80% from 1985 to 1998, consistent with the geographic 6. Berger and DeYoung (2001) found that the affiliates of banking organizations with 10 or more affiliates tend to exhibit above-average efficiency. deregulation of U.S. banking discussed above. In contrast, for the small bank sample, the increase in distance was only on the order of about 15%-30%. 7 As discussed above, the geographic expansion via acquisition of small bank affiliates may have proceeded more slowly because small banks may be more difficult to control and subject to more agency costs of distance because of their specialization in local relationships based on soft information. For both samples, the average distance in the survivor data sets tends to be less than in the full data sets, a finding that is broadly consistent with our conjectures about the deleterious effects of distance on organizational management and control.
MEASURING BANK EFFICIENCY RANKS
We base our analysis of lead and nonlead bank performance on the profit efficiency concept, rather than the often-used cost efficiency concept because profits are conceptually superior to costs for evaluating overall firm performance. The economic goal of profit maximization requires that the same amount of managerial attention be paid to raising a marginal dollar of revenue as to reducing a marginal dollar of costs. As well, if there are substantial unmeasured differences in the quality of services across banks and over time-which is almost surely the case-a bank that produces higher quality services should receive higher revenues that compensate it for at least some of its extra costs of producing that higher quality. Such a bank may be measured as less cost efficient because of the extra associated costs but will appropriately be measured as more profit efficient if its customers are willing to pay more than the extra costs in exchange for the higher quality. As discussed below, we also perform all the tests using cost efficiency as a robustness check, with similar findings.
We start with a profit function at time t of the form:
where π is bank profit and θ t is a constant for year t that makes π it ϩ θ t positive for all banks (so that the dependent variable expressed as a natural log is defined); i indexes banks (ϭ 1, N); f denotes some functional form; w is the vector of variable input prices faced by the bank; y is the vector of its variable output quantities; z indicates the quantities of any fixed netputs (inputs or outputs); v is a set of variables measuring the economic environment in the bank's local market(s); ln u π is a factor that represents a bank's efficiency; and ln ⑀ π is random error that incorporates both measurement error and luck. We estimate the profit function separately each year using OLS, treating (ln u π ϩ ln ⑀ π ) as a composite error term.
The profit efficiency of bank i at time t is based on a comparison of its actual profits (adjusted for random error) to the maximum potential (best-practice) profits 7. The overall increase from 123.35 to 188.91 miles between 1985 and 1998 cited in the introduction is based on the weighted averages from the full data sets for the main and small bank data sets. it could attain given its output bundle and other exogenous variables (w, y, z, v) . Assuming temporarily that we have an estimate of the efficiency factor ln û π it , the profit efficiency of bank i at time t would be given by:
where û π maxt is the maximum û π it across all banks in the sample. PROFEFF can be thought of as the proportion of a bank's maximum profits that it actually earns. 8 We take two additional steps to arrive at the estimates of the efficiency ranks, NONLEADRANK and LEADRANK, that are used in our analysis of the changes over time in the control and distance derivatives. First, we use the residuals from OLS estimation of Equation (8) as estimates of the profit efficiency factor ln û π it . Second, we create a rank ordering of the banks in each year and peer group (main sample or small bank sample) based on those residuals. Profit efficiency ranks measure how well a bank is predicted to perform relative to other banks in their main sample or small bank sample peer group for producing the same output bundle under the same exogenous conditions in the same year. These ranks are calculated on a uniform scale over [0, 1], using the formula (order it Ϫ 1)ր(n t Ϫ 1), where order it is the place in ascending order of the ith bank in the t th year in terms of its profit efficiency and n t is the number of banks in the relevant sample in year t. Thus, bank i's efficiency rank in year t gives the proportion of the banks in its peer group in year t with lower efficiency (e.g., a bank in year t with efficiency better than 80% of its peer group has a rank of 0.80). The worst-practice bank in the relevant sample (lowest PROFEFF) has a rank of 0, and the best-practice bank (highest PROFEFF) has a rank of 1.
We use efficiency ranks, rather than efficiency levels, because ranks are more comparable over time. The main purposes of this research are to test for intertemporal changes in parental control and the agency costs of distance on nonlead bank performance, which we proxy by changes in ∂NONLEADRANK/∂LEADRANK and ∂NONLEADRANK/∂lnDISTANCE over time. Efficiency levels may change considerably over time with the interest rate cycle, real estate cycle, macroeconomic cycle, and changes in bank regulation. Thus, comparing efficiency levels at different times might confound changes in the distribution of efficiency with changes in parental control or with changes in the agency costs of distance. Using efficiency ranks-that is, ranking banks within a uniform [0,1] distribution in each time period-generally neutralizes this problem by focusing on the relative order of the banks in the efficiency distribution at a given time.
8. This is often called 'alternative' profit efficiency because we specify output quantities y, rather than output prices p, in the profit function. We use this concept primarily because output prices are difficult to measure accurately for commercial banks and because output quantities are relatively fixed in the short run and cannot respond quickly to changing prices as is assumed in the standard profit efficiency. Prior research generally found similar results for estimates of standard and alternative profit efficiency (e.g., Berger and Mester 1997). Our method is a special case of the distribution-free efficiency measurement approach that uses a single residual instead of averaging residuals over a number of years. The single-residual method here is less accurate than the usual distributionfree approach, which averages out more random error by using more years of data. Our approach should also yield ranks that are very similar to those yielded by the stochastic frontier approach, an approach that is commonly used to estimate efficiency in a single cross-section. 9 We estimate the profit function using the Fourier-flexible functional form, which has been shown to fit the data for U.S. banks better than the more commonly specified translog form (e.g., Berger and DeYoung 1997) . We specify three variable input prices (local market prices of purchased funds, core deposits, and labor); four variable outputs y (consumer loans, business loans, real estate loans, and securities); three fixed netputs z (off-balance-sheet activity, physical capital, and financial equity capital); and an environmental variable STNPL (ratio of total nonperforming loansto-total loans in the bank's state). By using local market input prices, rather than the prices paid by each bank, the efficiency ranks will reflect how well individual banks price their inputs.
We calculate efficiency ranks using virtually all U.S. commercial banks for every year, 1985-98, although our regressions only include the efficiency ranks of banks that are lead banks or nonlead affiliates in MBHCs. The profit functions are always estimated separately for the main sample and the small bank sample because of the differences in products and markets discussed above. Table 2 displays the estimated parameters of regressions using 1985-98 U.S. banking data. Equation (1) is estimated four times: for the full and survivor data sets from the main sample (GTA Ͼ $100 million in real 1998 dollars) and for the full and survivor data sets from the small bank sample (GTA ≤ $100 million in real 1998 dollars). The key exogenous variables-LEADRANK, lnDISTANCE, and t-are all interacted, so no one coefficient on these variables can be easily interpreted by itself. We focus on the control and distance derivatives derived from the formulas shown in Equations (2)-(7). To avoid confounding our estimates of parental control and agency costs of distance with the effects of changes in the exogenous variables over time, we evaluate the control and distance derivatives at the overall 1985-98 sample means for the exogenous variables (with the exception in some cases of the time variable t).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Control and Distance Derivatives
The top panel in Table 3 shows the estimated control derivatives at the mean of t from Equation (2), ∂NONLEADRANKր∂LEADRANK tϭmean .When evaluated at 9. This is because the stochastic frontier approach also forms the expectation of the inefficiency term ln u it based on the observed residual, and this ranking is in the same order as the residuals for any distributions imposed on ln u and ln ⑀. Note: Data sets are unbalanced panels, 1985-98. Superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significant difference from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Coefficients for state dummy variables not reported. For the main sample, full data set, these values are 0.44, 0.15, 0.42, and 0.71, respectively. The points of evaluation are similar for the other samples. The values in parentheses are t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significant difference from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
the mean of lnDISTANCE (first column), all four of the control derivatives are positive and between 0 (no control) and 1 (very good control), as expected. All four are also all statistically significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. The positive, statistically significant control derivatives indicate that after accounting for other factors-such as distance, local market economic conditions, bank and MBHC size, and state regulations-lead bank efficiency and nonlead bank performance are significantly positively related. This suggests that senior managers at the lead banks are able to transfer their policies, practices, and procedures to management at their nonlead affiliate banks to at least some degree. The magnitudes of these control derivatives are similar for the main and small bank samples, suggesting that, on average, affiliate size is not an important determinant of the ability of headquarters managers to control the efficiency of affiliate banks. The control derivatives are materially larger for the survivor banks relative to the full data set, consistent with our expectations that MBHCs in which control was weak should be more likely to exit the industry via failure or takeover. In all cases, the derivatives appear to be economically significant. For example, the control derivative of 0.235 in the first cell of panel A indicates that a 10 percentage point increase in lead bank efficiency rank would yield a predicted increase of 2.35 percentage points in the efficiency ranks of each of its nonlead bank affiliates.
Evaluating the control derivative at the 25 th , 50 th , and 75 th percentiles of the sample distribution of lnDISTANCE (last three columns) shows how the magnitude of lead bank control changes with distance. The results suggest that control diminishes with distance, as expected. For example, as shown in the top row of panel A for the main sample, full data set, the control derivative is 4.0 percentage points lower for nonlead affiliates at the median distance or 50 th percentile (0.231) than for affiliates closer to headquarters at the at the 25 th percentile of distance (0.271). Similarly, the control derivative falls by about another 3.6 percentage points for affiliates that are even more remote at the 75 th distance percentile (0.195). The bottom panel in Table 3 shows the estimated distance derivatives at the mean of t from Equation (5), ∂NONLEADRANKր∂lnDISTANCE tϭmean . When evaluated at the mean of LEADRANK (first column), these derivatives are negative and statistically significant in three of the four cases, consistent with our hypothesis that aligning the incentives of local managers with those of the organization generally becomes more difficult with distance, resulting in lower affiliate bank efficiency. Although these estimated distance derivatives are small in absolute magnitude, the effect of a change in distance can be substantial for a banking organization that expands over very large distances within the United States. For example, the distance derivative of Ϫ0.013 (main sample, survivor data set) indicates that a doubling of the distance between a nonlead bank and its headquarters from about 240 miles to about 480 miles would reduce the efficiency rank of the nonlead bank by almost a full percentage point (Ϫ0.013*ln 2). Much larger potential reductions of efficiency rank would be predicted for cross-country acquisitions, although we caution against extrapolating too far from the dense part of the data sample.
The absolute magnitude of the distance derivative is smaller in the small bank sample, suggesting perhaps that agency problems in monitoring banks that rely more on soft information are less sensitive to the distance from headquarters. In addition, we find that the negative effects of distance tend to be greater in surviving organizations and in organizations with more efficient lead banks. Notably, the distance derivative is positive and statistically significant in three of four cases when evaluated at the 25 th percentile for LEADRANK, consistent with the possibility raised above that for very inefficient senior management, the senior management effect may overwhelm the general agency cost effect. That is, it may on net be more efficient to be further away from such management to avoid the transfer of their inefficient practices.
Intertemporal Changes in the Control and Distance Derivatives
The main focus of our research is on the changes over time in the control and distance derivatives. We hypothesize that these derivatives should increase with t as improvements in financial and nonfinancial technologies improved the control of banking organizations and reduced the agency costs of distances. We calculate each of these derivatives for each of the regressions in Table 2 (3) and (6), ∂NONLEADRANKր∂LEADRANK tϭ14 Ϫ ∂NONLEADRANKր∂LEADRANK tϭ1 and ∂NONLEADRANKր∂lnDISTANCE tϭ14 Ϫ ∂NONLEADRANKր∂lnDISTANCE tϭ1 , which measure the change in the control 1985-98. and distance derivatives from the beginning to the end of the 1985-98 sample period. Panel C of these tables displays the cross-derivative tests (4) and (7), ∂ 2 NONLEADRANKր∂LEADRANK∂t tϭmean and ∂ 2 NONLEADRANKր ∂lnDISTANCE∂t tϭmean , which measure the change in the control and distance 1985-98. derivatives with respect to time at the means of the data. We view tests (3) and (6) as more important than the cross-derivative tests (4) and (7) because the (3) and (6) tests measure the effects over the entire time period, not just at the mean of the period.
10 Panel D repeats tests (3) and (6) (Table 4 ) and the same percentiles for LEADRANK for the change in distance derivatives (Table 5 ).
All four of the control derivatives mapped out in Figures 2 and 3 are generally increasing over time and are larger at the end of the sample period than at the beginning. The U-or inverted U-shapes of these time paths are dictated by our quadratic regression specification. The estimated time paths decrease somewhat at the end of the sample period for the main sample, which may also reflect the large number of M&As made during this time period (see discussion below). We focus primarily on the change over the entire time period t ϭ 1 to 1 ϭ 14-shown in panel B of Table 4 -which indicate that all four of the control derivatives increased during the sample period, three of which were statistically significant. Moreover, these improvements in parental control over time were economically significant-the smallest increase was about 35%, from 0.233 to 0.314 (small bank sample, survivor data set) while the largest increase was about 89%, from 0.160 to 0.303 (small bank (2), the control derivative, evaluated at the overall means of the data for all variables other than t. Panel B shows the estimated values for Equation (3), the change in the control derivative between t ϭ 1 and t ϭ 14, along with associated t-statistics. Panel C shows the estimated for Equation (4), the change in the control derivative with respect to t at the means of the data, along with associated t-statistics. Panel D shows the change in the control derivative with respect to t at the means of the data, evaluated at the 25 th , 50 th , and 75 th percentiles of the sample distribution of lnDISTANCE. Superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significant difference from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
sample, full data set). Panel C of Table 4 shows similar results for the intertemporal change in the control derivatives evaluated at the mean value of time t. Overall, these data are strongly consistent with our hypothesis that technological progress has allowed banking organizations to exercise substantially more control over nonlead affiliates over time. Notably, the measured increases in control in panels B and C are generally greater for small bank affiliates than large bank affiliates. Although an investigation of this difference is beyond the scope of this paper, this finding is consistent with the possibility raised above that technological progress may have allowed MBHCs to apply some of the hard-information techniques to small bank affiliates for the first time, yielding substantial increases in control over these affiliates.
The improvement in parental control over time was sensitive to the distance between the lead and nonlead banks, as shown by Equation (3) results in panel D (5), the distance derivative, evaluated at the overall means of the data for all variables other than t. Panel B shows the estimated values for Equation (3), the change in the distance derivative between t ϭ 1 and t ϭ 14, along with associated t-statistics. Panel C shows the estimated for Equation (4), the change in the distance derivative with respect to t at the means of the data, along with associated t-statistics. Panel D shows the change in the distance derivative with respect to t at the means of the data, evaluated at the 25 th , 50 th , and 75 th percentiles of the sample distribution of LEADRANK. Superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significant difference from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
of Table 4 . In the main sample, control improved the most for the relatively distant affiliates, consistent with the possibility raised above that technological progress allowed a greater increase in control for longer distances for these banks because of the electronic transmission of hard information with little or no effect of distance. In the small bank sample, however, we find that the control derivative improved more dramatically over time at the relatively nearby affiliates. This is consistent with the possibility that for small affiliates, control improvements from the export of hard-information technologies to small affiliates may have occurred more frequently for affiliates closer to MBHC headquarters.
Turning to the effects of technological progress on the agency costs of distance, all four of the distance derivatives plotted in Figures 4 and 5 increased over time. Panels B and C of Table 5 indicate that the intertemporal changes in the distance derivatives were statistically significant. These changes were also economically significant. The increase in the distance derivative between 1985 and 1998 tends to center around 0.04, suggesting that a doubling of distance from the lead bank reduced the efficiency rank of a nonlead bank by about 2.8 percentage points less at the end of the sample period than at the beginning of the sample period (0.04*ln2). These data are consistent with our hypothesis that technological progress has reduced the agency costs of distance, and the effects do not differ greatly for large and small nonlead banks. As noted above, this finding may also reflect in part other causes, such as the increased integration of state and regional economies.
The degree to which the distance derivative increased over time was somewhat sensitive to the efficiency of the lead bank in the organization, as shown by Equation (6) results in panel D of Table 5 . For banks in the main sample, the data suggest that efficient lead banks were able to reduce the agency costs of distance more for large nonlead bank affiliates. This is consistent with the possibility that efficient lead banks that likely specialize in the use of hard-information technologies also excelled at reducing the agency costs of distance for large nonlead affiliates that also likely specialize in these same technologies. In contrast, the data suggest that for the small bank sample, distance-related inefficiencies declined more slowly over time for organizations with efficient lead banks. This is consistent with the possibility that efficient lead banks that specialize in hard-information technologies were not as able to reduce agency costs associated with distance to small nonlead banks that tend to use soft-information technologies.
The intertemporal increases in the control and distance derivatives shown in Figures 2-5 occur mostly during the first portion of the sample period. Although the shapes of these estimated time paths are constrained by our quadratic specification of time, these shapes suggest that improvements in parental control and reductions in the agency costs of distance may have been easier to achieve during the late 1980s than in the 1990s. A full investigation of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this study, but we suggest two reasonable hypotheses that are consistent with the data. First, the mergers of the 1990s tended to be larger, more complex, and involve more distant target banks (see Figure 1 , especially for the main sample), which may have posed more difficult managerial challenges than the mergers of the 1980s. Second, as discussed above, banking was one of the first industries to take advantage of improvements in information processing and telecommunications, consistent with the measured productivity gains made by banks in the late 1980s.
Robustness Tests
We performed a number of additional robustness checks that are not shown in the tables and figures. First, we performed all of the above tests using cost efficiency ranks in place of profit efficiency ranks, and obtained similar, but somewhat weaker results. This suggests that technological advances as implemented at banking companies has helped improve parental control over both expenses and revenues, and reduce the impact of distance-related agency costs on both expenses and revenues, although the improvements were generally more pronounced on the revenue side.
Second, we estimated the regressions using subperiods of the data-1985-1991 (the first half of the panel), 1992-98 (the second half of the panel), and 1985-96 (before full effect of Riegle-Neal Act). These regressions yielded qualitatively similar results to those from the overall 1985-98 time period. Third, we estimated the regressions using efficiency levels rather than efficiency ranks, and using linear distance rather than the natural log of distance. These regressions always produced theoretically correct signs for the control and distance derivatives, although the behavior of these derivatives across time was somewhat less robust. Finally, we replaced each panel regression with 14 annual cross-section regressions.
11 This cross-sectional approach allows all of the estimated regression parameters to vary freely from year to year and does not force the control and distance derivatives to follow smooth parabolic paths over time, but this approach also reduces estimation efficiency relative to our panel approach because of the fewer numbers of restrictions. Although some of the resulting derivatives exhibited substantial noise from year to year, the results were qualitatively similar to our panel regression results.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we test if the data on banks in U.S. MBHCs over 1985-98 are consistent with some hypotheses about the effects of technological progress on the ability of the banking industry to expand geographically. The empirical results are strongly consistent with the predictions of our hypothesis that technological progress has allowed banking organizations to exercise substantially more control over nonlead affiliates over time. Specifically, our estimates suggest that the influence of a lead bank's efficiency rank on the efficiency rank of its nonlead bank affiliates is substantial, and this ability to control its affiliates increased on the order of 50%-100% over the sample period. Furthermore, our estimates suggest that senior managers improved their ability to control both the costs and the revenues of their nonlead affiliates over the sample period. The data are also consistent with our hypothesis that technological progress has allowed banking organizations to reduce the agency costs that arise when nonlead affiliate banks are located far away from headquarters. These improvements appear to be more substantial on the revenue side than on the cost side of banks' income statements.
The issue of whether technological progress is facilitating the geographic expansion of the banking industry has important implications. Currently, only a few organizations in the United States have come close to expanding nationwide; only one has approached the Riegle-Neal cap of 10% of national bank and thrift deposits in one organization; and some banking organizations have explicitly reduced their 11. These regressions repeat the Equation (1) specification with two exceptions: we exclude the variable t as it has no cross-sectional variation; and we exclude UNITB, LIMITB, INTERSTATE, and ACCESS as they do not vary for banks within a state in a given year, making them redundant to the STATE DUMMIES. geographic footprints. Similarly, very few banks have taken advantage of the opportunity for almost continent-wide banking in Europe under the Single Market Programme. Nonetheless, if technological progress improves parental control and reduces the agency costs of distance, and if future technological innovations continue to have these effects, then we might expect many more banks to take advantage of the economies these innovations create and increase their geographic expansions. Although the MBHC form is primarily a vestige of past geographic restrictions on U.S. banking, we believe our findings are relevant for the future performance of banks in the United States and in other nations that use different organizational forms. That is, advances in information, telecommunications, and financial technologies are likely to improve managerial control and/or reduce the agency costs of distance within domestic branching networks, at foreign bank subsidiaries, and at (domestic and foreign) nonbank affiliates in qualitatively similar fashions to the effects found here.
Although geographic expansions related to improved control and reduced agency costs of distance would be associated with improved efficiency of the individual financial organizations, they could raise other questions. Cross-border consolidation may increase the cost of coordinating the regulatory responses among various national authorities to the failures of large multinational banking organizations. For instance, in the EU, national central banks have lender-of-last-resort responsibilities, whereas the European Central Bank controls monetary policy. Similarly, the "homecountry rule" established in the EU by the Second Banking Directive provides that the chartering nation has primary supervisory responsibility for the bank, which may separate where the impact of financial distress is felt and where the responsibility for handling the problems lie. In the United States, state-chartered banks can now branch into other states across the nation, although this likely does not create as many problems as in the EU, since state-chartered banks also have a primary federal supervisor and banking powers and regulations do not vary extensively across the states.
There may also be concerns about the effects of geographic expansion on the supply of some types of locally oriented services, such as relationship credit for small businesses. Expansion may create large organizations with headquarters that are distant from potential relationship loan customers, and these organizations may have difficulty transmitting "soft" relationship information through their communications channels, may be focused more on serving large corporate customers, or (in the case of international expansion) may be headquartered in very different banking environments. However, to some extent these effects may be offset by the use of credit scoring and other financial technologies that may allow banks to lend at greater distances by "hardening" the credit information.
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